In plain terms: the courts have begun to say what the Employee Retention Credit's governmental-orders test means, and this page collects every decision located through September 2026. Two courts have read the statute as written. A federal court in Washington held that a "partial suspension" is any temporary delay, interruption or termination of part of a business, that "due to" means ordinary but-for causation, and that the Service's ten percent figure is a method of qualifying rather than a requirement. A federal court in Arizona held that Notice 2021-20 has no force of law. Three courts in Mississippi refused the Government's demand that a business plead, order by order, which order caused which suspension. A handful of courts have added a "proximate cause" requirement that the statute does not contain; those decisions are listed, pinned and answered below. Every entry cites the decision's own pages so that you can read it yourself.
Decisions marked with a dash are public court filings cited by docket entry and page. The table is current to September 15, 2026; no decision construing the Suspension Clause issued after July 23, 2026 was located in the public opinion indexes, whose coverage of district-court orders is incomplete.
Two courts have construed the clause on its words
Two courts have construed the Suspension Clause on the merits of its words in terms that bind the United States to the statute: Tri-State, whose holdings are set out below, and the District of Arizona in Stenson Tamaddon, which held the Notice interpretive and without force of law and accepted, as the ground of its judgment, the United States' account of the ten percent figure as a safe harbor "subject to rebuttal."1
Tri-State Memorial Hospital v. United States (E.D. Wash. May 28, 2026)
Tri-State Memorial Hospital v. United States, No. 2:25-cv-0181-TOR, ECF No. 38 (E.D. Wash. May 28, 2026) (Rice, J.). A refund suit by a nonprofit community hospital for the first three quarters of 2021, resting on Washington Proclamation 20-24.2, which imposed more than thirty separate requirements on health-care operations. The United States moved to dismiss on January 20, 2026; on May 28, 2026 the court refused the motion, deciding the meaning of "partially suspended" and "due to" on the United States' own agreed definitions. The order's pages equal its ECF pages.2
What the court held
The statute is unambiguous, on both parties' account. "Neither party claims that any part of the statute is ambiguous" (at 8). The United States agreed that "suspension" means "[t]he act of temporarily delaying, interrupting, or terminating something," the definition of Black's Law Dictionary, and asked the court to read the clause by "plain meaning, statutory context, and administrative guidance" (at 8-9).3
A partial suspension is a delay, interruption or termination of a portion. "[A] 'partial suspension' is a temporary delay, interruption, or termination of a portion an employer's business. The language is plain" (at 9). The court considered the Notice under Skidmore and adopted Q&A-11's "more than a nominal portion" formulation only "because it does not contradict the agreed-upon definitions of the parties" (at 9-10).4
"More than nominal" is not "significant." The United States asked for a disruption "comparable to a closure that surpasses basic economic impact that all employers faced" and "a temporary closure of a significant portion of operations." The court refused: "Defendant attempts to conflate 'more than nominal' to suggest that it means 'significant' ... However, the plain language and ordinary meaning of partial and nominal do not suggest either of those interpretations" (at 10-11).5
Legislative history, Chief Counsel advice and the title do not narrow the clause. "Until the language is deemed ambiguous, the Court does not look to legislative history" (at 11); the Chief Counsel generic legal advice the United States offered "may not be used or cited as precedent," and its scenarios "are not comparable or persuasive" (at 11-12); and of the heading's word "closure," "[i]t is more likely that the use of 'closure' in the title of the statute is used to recognize closure and other disruptions" (at 12).6
The gross-receipts prong is an independent route. The United States argued that the gross-receipts prong shows the suspension prong to be narrow; the court found "even Defendant's own argument is contradictory" and held that "[c]onsidering the Gross Receipts Test is by Defendant's admission, another method to qualify under for the credit, the fact an employer can be eligible and affected without partial or full suspension is reasonable" (at 12-13).7
The pleaded changes are a partial suspension. Cancelled non-urgent services, surgeries and procedures; surge-capacity monitoring; cancelled visits for symptomatic patients; reduced beds; single-occupancy isolation rooms held for "air changes and specialized cleaning"; limited MRI and CT access; a minor-care center converted to testing and vaccination; staff quarantines: "Plaintiff alleges enough facts to support the plausibility that more than a nominal portion of its operations were either interrupted or stopped due to Proclamation 20-24.2" (at 13-15).8
The ten percent figure is a method, not a requirement. The figure is "only administrative guidance and is not stated in the statutory text"; "[w]hile the Court used this to support the interpretation of 'partial suspension' and adopted a portion of that meaning, it does not require the Court to adopt additional requirements not provided for in the statute"; "[i]f the court were to do this, it would read requirements into the statute that do not exist. Instead, the IRS Notice provides a method for the test to be met not as a requirement to meet the test" (at 15-16). The court cited the District of Arizona's order in Stenson Tamaddon, "which both parties used for support" (at 16).9
"Due to" is but-for causation. "Both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that the plain meaning of 'due to' is 'because of.' ... The meaning is plain and unambiguous" (at 17). Of the United States' "proximate, independent, and sufficient cause" theory: "Defendant's interpretation improperly adds words into the statute. ... Accordingly, the Court recognizes that 'due to' requires 'but-for' causation" (at 18-19), on the authority of Burrage, Gross, Thomas v. CalPortland and Abercrombie. The hospital "has alleged facts that but-for the Proclamation, Plaintiff's operations would not be partially suspended" (at 19-20).10
The order, not the virus, caused the compelled protocols. The United States argued that the hospital would have taken its protective steps regardless of the proclamation. The court held: "Some of the interruptions and diversions were caused by COVID-19 illness, however, the required protocols and procedures to comply with the Proclamation were not. ... Sick patients and employees alone did not require additional protocols. Based on this argument, there are not many businesses or any business that would be eligible under the ERC at all. Therefore, this argument fails" (at 20-21). "The Proclamation required Plaintiff to only employ vaccinated individuals," and the changes "were not voluntary" (at 20).11
What the decision establishes
Those holdings state the law this analysis applies to every industry. A delay is a suspension; an interruption is a suspension; a portion is any portion; "more than nominal" is the United States' own persuasive gloss and is not "significant"; and every protocol an order compelled (screening, distancing, capacity, isolation, testing, cancelled procedures, reassigned staff) is a suspension the order caused. The United States' contrary theory would, in the court's words, leave "not many businesses or any business" eligible under a clause Congress re-enacted for the third and fourth quarters of 2021 on March 11, 2021 and left in place for the third quarter when it terminated the fourth on November 15, 2021.12 Every refusal in the order is a refusal of a gloss the Service's letters apply as law: "significant," "closure," a ten percent requirement, a proximate-cause test, and the argument that the virus rather than the order caused the change. The fourteen grounds answer each of them from this record.
Stenson Tamaddon, LLC v. IRS (D. Ariz. June 20, 2025), appeal No. 25-4217 (9th Cir.)
Stenson Tamaddon, LLC v. IRS, No. 2:24-cv-01123-SPL, ECF No. 49 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2025) (Logan, J.), 2025 WL 1725942, appeal docketed, No. 25-4217 (9th Cir.). An ERC advisory firm sued on May 14, 2024, challenging the Notice under the Administrative Procedure Act and the moratorium on processing new claims. The District Court heard the preliminary-injunction motion on July 16, 2024; the United States cross-moved for summary judgment on January 6, 2025 (Doc. 44); the District Court granted judgment to the United States on June 20, 2025 (Doc. 49) on the single ground that the Notice is interpretive guidance without the force of law, calling the case "a close call"; the plaintiff appealed (Opening Br., Sept. 17, 2025); the United States answered (Br. for Appellees, Jan. 30, 2026); and argument is calendared for Monday, October 26, 2026, in Phoenix.13
What the court held
The Notice has no force of law. "[A] practical binding effect is not equivalent to a legally binding effect" (at 22); "the Notice carries no force of law and is entitled to no deference" (at 27).14
The ten percent figure is a safe harbor, subject to rebuttal. The United States characterized the provision as a "safe harbor"; the court wrote, "This Court agrees" (at 15). "[T]he ten-percent threshold is 'subject to rebuttal' because the IRS, in evaluating the 'facts and circumstances' when considering whether a business has been 'partially suspended'" retains its judgment; "[a]s the Government puts it, ... 'the IRS did not say that a taxpayer cannot qualify for the ERC if they have been impacted less than 10 percent'" (at 17, quoting Doc. 44 at 28). "[T]he ten percent standard is not an exclusionary cut-off point, but rather a safe harbor above which the IRS will consider there to have been a more-than-nominal disruption to business" (at 26).15
The judgment is conditioned on the Service retaining discretion. "[T]he Court is concerned by the prospect of something labeled as a 'policy statement' being practically applied as though it were a binding rule" (at 15-16); "[s]o long as the agency ultimately retains its discretion with respect to application of this 'nominal effects' test, this weighs against a finding that it constitutes a legislative rule" (at 16). The court quoted the United States' own sentence as a reason for its holding: "[O]ne would hope that the IRS is indeed evaluating ERC claims consistent with the explanations it has offered the public" (at 16, quoting Doc. 44 at 24 n.4).16
"Appropriate" means "fitting." "'[A]ppropriate' meaning 'especially suitable or compatible: fitting'"; "[t]he 'fitting' governmental authority would be the one having jurisdiction over an employer's operations" (at 13-14).17
The refund suit is the remedy. "[G]iven that the interpretive statements carry no binding effect, if a party disagrees with the IRS's interpretation as applied to their case, they retain an adequate remedy to challenge it—a tax refund suit" (at 20).18
Nothing but the text stood behind the Notice. "[T]here are no facts or data that the IRS could have relied upon in issuing its Notice" (at 24); "there was no identifiable factual evidence to consider—just the text of the statute" (at 25).19
The substantiation Q&As create no duty. "FAQs 70 and 71 merely 'clarify,' but do not create anew, an existing and underlying statutory duty" (at 18-19).20
The order also described Q&A-14 (the "voluntary" suspension) and Q&A-15 and Q&A-16 (the "comparable operations" test) as natural readings of the text (at 17-18). Those passages adjudicated no employer's claim; the same order holds that the Notice "carries no force of law" (at 27); and the words "voluntary" and "comparable operations" are not in the clause Congress wrote. The fourteen grounds answer each from the statute and the orders.
The representations that produced the judgment
The judgment adjudicated no employer's claim. The positions the United States took to obtain it were, however, positions about how the Service decides every claim, and the District Court accepted them as the reason the Notice binds no one.21 The United States wrote:
The Notice itself does not require [the plaintiff] or its clients to do anything or prevent them from doing anything.
Doc. 44 at 19
Rather than setting a threshold or a requirement, what the IRS has explained is that in its interpretation, partial suspension means something between a full suspension and no suspension. ... The 10 percent is not determinative for whether an employer has been partially suspended. ... Effectively, this is a safe harbor ... Properly understood, it isn't an eligibility requirement.
Doc. 44 at 14
If Notice 2021-20 did not exist, the IRS would still have a duty to approve or deny a claim for refund under I.R.C. § 3134 using its own interpretation of its terms and, in any refund suit, the courts would still determine whether the IRS's interpretation was correct or not. ... Whether Notice 2021-20 exists or not, the statute will control whether a refund is warranted.
Doc. 44 at 24
To the Ninth Circuit the United States called the Notice "nonbinding guidance," wrote that "the Notice does not have the force of law in this respect (or any other)," and stated: "There is no question of deference here."22 Of the ten percent provision it wrote:
The language of the Notice speaks of sufficient—though not necessary—conditions. ... That is a quintessential safe harbor. In reading the 10 percent provision otherwise, [the plaintiff] erroneously swaps an 'if' with an 'only if.'
Br. for Appellees at 37-38
The appeal
The question before the court of appeals is whether the Notice is a legislative rule that required notice and comment. The appellant's opening brief contends from the record that "[i]n practice, the IRS has enforced the Notice as binding law": the Service's own statement that "Notice 2021-20 governs the ERC for all periods"; Forms 886-A deciding claims on the ten percent figure; and the United States' having "identified no instance where a claim was approved below the 10 percent cutoff." The United States' answering brief supports the judgment on the grounds that the Notice is "nonbinding guidance," that the ten percent provision is "a safe harbor rather than a hard floor," that "a business may be suspended 'due to' a government order addressing a third party," and that the substantiation guidance "is not mandatory."23 Argument is calendared for Monday, October 26, 2026, in Phoenix. Whatever the court of appeals decides about the Administrative Procedure Act, the United States' descriptions of the Notice in both courts stand as statements of a party-opponent, admissible against it in any refund suit, and the District Court's acceptance of them is written on the face of its order. The standards page sets out the doctrines.
Three courts refused order-by-order pleading of proximate cause
Three district courts in Mississippi have refused the United States' demand for order-by-order pleading of proximate cause, holding that a claimant is not required "to plead with specificity the government orders," that pleading fifty-five orders is not a shotgun pleading, and that "there is no statutory, regulatory, or binding precedent requiring such specificity at the pleading stage."24
Plastic Film, LLC v. United States (S.D. Miss. Jan. 20 and June 22, 2026)
Plastic Film, LLC v. United States, No. 5:25-cv-30-DCB-LGI, ECF No. 18 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 20, 2026), 2026 WL 144343 (Ex. LAW-083); ECF No. 45 (June 22, 2026) (Ex. LAW-084). The court dismissed the Administrative Procedure Act counts and let the refund claim for the third quarter of 2020 proceed: "Although the Complaint does not identify a specific governmental order, there is no statutory, regulatory, or binding precedent requiring such specificity at the pleading stage. Whether the referenced orders ultimately substantiate Plaintiff's eligibility for the credit presents a fact-intensive issue appropriately addressed through discovery or at summary judgment" (ECF No. 18 at 8). In June the court refused, without prejudice, the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings against the United States' erroneous-refund counterclaim and granted the United States leave to amend it (ECF No. 45).25
Region IV Mental Health Services v. United States (N.D. Miss. July 1, 2026)
Region IV Mental Health Services v. United States, No. 3:26-cv-12-RPC-JMV, ECF No. 21 (N.D. Miss. July 1, 2026), 2026 WL 1897120 (Ex. LAW-081). The United States argued, on the authority of JPM Restaurant, that a plaintiff "must plead specific government orders were the but for cause of the business suspension for each specific tax quarter." The court held that "Region IV is not required to plead with specificity the government orders that caused its alleged suspensions at this stage" (at 9-10) and that a complaint identifying "at least 55 alleged government orders" is not a shotgun pleading (at 9). The Rule 12(b)(6) motion was refused; the motion was granted only as to a request for declaratory relief concerning a recapture for the second quarter of 2021.26
South Delta Planning & Development District v. United States (N.D. Miss. July 15, 2026)
South Delta Planning & Development District v. United States, No. 4:25-cv-197-JDM-RP, ECF No. 30 (N.D. Miss. July 15, 2026) (Maxwell, J.) (Ex. LAW-082). "As to the United States' claim that, to sufficiently plead an ERC refund claim, the complaint must pinpoint a specific order that proximately caused the alleged partial shutdown, that claim was recently rejected by the Southern District of Mississippi" (at 7, following Plastic Film and Region IV). The Rule 12(b)(6) motion was refused, the Rule 12(b)(1) motion was granted in part and refused in part, and the stay was lifted (at 7-8).27
The proximate-cause line, answered
The Court of Federal Claims (Northeast Health Services, Sundancer Pools, I Health), the Eastern District of Tennessee (JPM Restaurant, on appeal to the Sixth Circuit), the District of Minnesota (Tapestry Senior Housing) and a bankruptcy court in North Carolina (JSmith Civil) have read into "due to" a proximate-cause requirement the clause does not contain, on a rationale about the breadth of the suspension prong that is, in the Supreme Court's words, "Congress's province," not a court's.28
The answers are the statute's
"Due to" means "because of," both parties in Tri-State agreed that it does, and the Supreme Court has held four times that "because of" is but-for causation; "proximate" is not in the clause, and adding it is "Congress's province."29 Burrage refused the Government's request to loosen a causation phrase for policy reasons, and Bostock accepted that but-for causation "can be a sweeping standard" with "multiple but-for causes"; breadth is the consequence of the words Congress chose.30 The breadth rationale is the policy argument Tri-State refused, and the gross-receipts prong is an independent route that says nothing about the breadth of the suspension prong.31 The United States itself accepts that causation runs through a counterparty:
[A] business may be suspended 'due to' a government order addressing a third party (such as an order that suspends the operations of a supplier of the business).
Br. for Appellees at 41
The same brief states that the Notice's supplier rule "never even mentions a 'physical[ ] clos[ure]' order against the supplier"; causation through a counterparty is the Government's own position.32 The adverse courts accept the premises this analysis needs: Northeast Health Services held that health-department guidance issued under compulsory authority "qualifies as an 'order,'" and I Health treated California's Executive Orders N-25-20, N-33-20 and N-60-20 and the county orders as governmental orders.33 Tapestry's demand that the orders be identified with specificity is answered by the Library itself, which identifies every instrument by issuer, number, date, operative clause, effective and end dates and exhibit. The Sixth Circuit has JPM Restaurant before it, and the United States, which agreed in Tri-State that the statute is unambiguous, has told the Western District of Michigan this:
The statute does not define order, partial suspension, or the causation requirement. The parties in this case disagree about all three of these parts of the ERC.
County of Barry v. United States, No. 1:25-cv-01099, ECF No. 21, at 3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2026)
The definitions the Service administers in its letters are its own and not Congress's, which is this analysis's point.34
Northeast Health Services, LLC v. United States (Fed. Cl. May 28, 2026)
Northeast Health Services, LLC v. United States, No. 24-2096T (Fed. Cl. May 28, 2026) (Bonilla, J.), 2026 WL 1530240 (Ex. LAW-080). Cross-motions on Massachusetts COVID-19 Order Nos. 13 and 33 and Department of Public Health guidance; the United States' dispositive cross-motion granted. The court held that guidance promulgated under compulsory authority "qualifies as an 'order'" (at 12 & n.21); read "due to" to require that a qualifying order be both the factual and the proximate cause of the suspension (at 13-17); and refused a but-for reading on the ground that it would broaden the suspension prong (at 17). No appeal had been located as of September 15, 2026.35
The holding that guidance issued under compulsory authority is an order is the premise this analysis applies to every health-department instrument in the Library. The causation holding adds a word the clause does not contain, and its breadth rationale is the policy judgment Congress made when it wrote "due to," when both parties in Tri-State agreed that the phrase means "because of," and when Congress re-enacted the clause unchanged on March 11, 2021.
Sundancer Pools, Inc. v. United States (Fed. Cl. June 23, 2026)
Sundancer Pools, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-1291T (Fed. Cl. June 23, 2026) (Kaplan, J.), 2026 WL 1830419 (Ex. LAW-028). Judgment on the pleadings deferred with leave to amend; California and San Diego County orders; the second and third quarters of 2021. "The government has not argued that IRS Notice 2021-20 sets out binding interpretations of the governing statute" (at 2), and the court weighed the Notice as Skidmore guidance (at 2, 4). The court followed Northeast Health Services' factual-and-proximate-cause reading (at 5-6) and held that allegations of supply-chain restrictions and permit delays did not plead that an order was the proximate cause (at 7).36
The United States' choice not to argue that the Notice binds is the same position it took in the District of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit; three courts have now heard it. The causation holding is answered above.
I Health & Life Insurance Services v. United States (Fed. Cl. July 23, 2026)
I Health & Life Insurance Services v. United States, No. 25-1315T (Fed. Cl. July 23, 2026) (Bonilla, J.) (Ex. LAW-025). Ruling on the Rule 12(c) motion deferred pending amendment; California Executive Orders N-25-20, N-33-20 and N-60-20 and county orders; the third quarter of 2020 and later quarters. The court treated the State and county orders as governmental orders (at 2-3, 9), held occupancy caps and worker-exclusion rules adequately pleaded as orders (at 14), and required an allegation that a qualifying order factually and proximately caused the cessation of a distinct portion of the business (at 14, 17).37
The premise that California's State and county orders are governmental orders is the one this analysis applies to every California instrument in the Library. The requirement of a "distinct portion" answers itself in Tri-State's definition: a partial suspension is a delay, interruption or termination "of a portion" of the business, and an occupancy cap or a worker-exclusion rule is such an interruption of the function it reached.
JPM Restaurant, LLC v. United States (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2026), appeal No. 26-5281 (6th Cir.)
JPM Restaurant, LLC v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-357 (E.D. Tenn.) (Collier, J.), 2026 WL 561147 (Feb. 27, 2026), appeal docketed, No. 26-5281 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2026). Summary judgment for the United States. The merits opinion is not on any public docket mirror; it is cited here as four courts have recited it: "due to" requires factual and proximate causation, and a labor-shortage causal chain was held too attenuated. The Library holds the court's order of October 29, 2025 refusing reconsideration of a stay (Ex. LAW-086). The appeal presents, in the United States' words, "the district court's definition of partially suspended and causation determination"; the United States' brief was due in the Sixth Circuit on September 25, 2026.38
The answer is the statute's, above. Region IV refused the United States' argument built on JPM Restaurant at the pleading stage (at 9-10), and the Sixth Circuit will decide the definitions on a statute whose causation phrase both parties in Tri-State agreed means "because of."
County of Barry v. United States (W.D. Mich.), the United States' motion to stay of September 4, 2026
County of Barry v. United States, No. 1:25-cv-01099-RJJ-RSK, ECF No. 21 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2026) (Ex. LAW-085). Not a decision: the United States' opposed motion to stay pending the Sixth Circuit's decision in JPM Restaurant. Its value is the United States' own account of the state of the law. The statute "does not define order, partial suspension, or the causation requirement," and "[t]he parties in this case disagree about all three of these parts of the ERC" (at 3); the case "is one of four ERC cases being litigated by the same counsel," and cross-motions for summary judgment are pending in Marquette County Medical Care Facility v. United States, No. 2:25-cv-135 (W.D. Mich.) (at 4); the JSmith Civil appeal is pending, No. 5:25-cv-513 (E.D.N.C.) (at 2).39
A party that agreed in Tri-State that "[n]either party claims that any part of the statute is ambiguous" and that "due to" means "because of" now describes the causation requirement as undefined. The Service's letters nonetheless decide claims on definitions of "order," "partial suspension" and causation as though they were settled; by the United States' own account they are the Service's, not Congress's.
Tapestry Senior Housing Management, LLC v. United States (D. Minn. June 25, 2026)
Tapestry Senior Housing Management, LLC v. United States, No. 25-cv-3419, ECF No. 29 (D. Minn. June 25, 2026) (Provinzino, J.) (Ex. LAW-031). Complaint dismissed without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The complaint referred to Ohio and Pennsylvania orders without identifying them; the court held that orders not named must be described with specificity (at 10-11) and followed JPM Restaurant's factual-and-proximate-cause formulation (at 10).40
The specificity holding is answered by the Library. Every instrument on this site carries its issuer, number, date, operative clause, effective and end dates and exhibit, and the record builder assembles them by State, metropolitan area, industry and quarter. Three courts in Mississippi have held that no such specificity is required at the pleading stage; the Library supplies it in any event.
In re JSmith Civil, LLC (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2025), appeal pending
In re JSmith Civil, LLC, No. 24-00004-5-JNC, Doc. 47 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2025) (Callaway, J.), 674 B.R. 207, appeal pending, No. 5:25-cv-513 (E.D.N.C.) (Ex. LAW-076). Summary judgment for the United States. A construction company relied on North Carolina Executive Order 121; the court held as a matter of law that the order did not require suspension of the company's operations as a construction company, a sector the order expressly excepted (at 10-11), and noted that the company's receipts and hiring grew during the period (at 11 n.6).41
The decision is fact-bound: it turned on a single order that excepted the plaintiff's own sector. It says nothing about an employer whose functions the orders reached, and nothing about the supplier, customer, venue, court and border orders and the standing statutory duties that the statute's words include. The construction analysis sets out the instruments that did reach construction operations, State by State.
Decisions on other questions
ERC Today, LLC v. McInelly (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026) (mem.)
ERC Today, LLC v. McInelly, No. 25-2642 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2026) (unpublished), 2026 WL 753306, aff'g 782 F. Supp. 3d 721 (D. Ariz. 2025) (Ex. LAW-027). Two tax-advisory firms sought a preliminary injunction against the Service's "Disallowance During Processing" program, which the court described as a process "to screen and categorically disallow thousands of taxpayer claims for the Employee Retention Credit." The District Court refused the injunction for want of Article III standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed: the appellants had not made the "clear showing" of financial, procedural, reputational or regulatory injury that the preliminary-injunction stage requires, and the court remanded, noting that leave to amend could cure the injury-in-fact showing (at 2-5).42 The disposition is procedural. It decides nothing about the Suspension Clause, the Notice or any employer's eligibility, and it is not precedent under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
First Source Employee Management, Inc. v. United States (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2026)
First Source Employee Management, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:24-cv-02209-CEF, Doc. 19 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2026) (Fleming, J.) (Ex. LAW-074). A professional employer organization's Administrative Procedure Act counts against the Notice were dismissed and its refund count proceeds: the refund action under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 "provides complete relief" (at 8, 15), and vacatur of the Notice would not redress the injury (at 9-12). The holding is consistent with the United States' position in Stenson Tamaddon that the refund suit is the forum in which "the statute will control whether a refund is warranted."43
Juggler Dave & Friends, LLC v. United States (Fed. Cl. Mar. 25, 2026)
Juggler Dave & Friends, LLC v. United States, No. 25-338 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 25, 2026) (Hertling, J.) (Ex. LAW-029). The claim for the third quarter of 2021 was dismissed under Pub. L. 119-21, § 70605(d), which bars credits under section 3134 claimed after January 31, 2024; the court held the retroactive bar consistent with due process; the credits for the first two quarters of 2021 had been paid (at 1-2, 9). A limitations decision; it does not construe the Suspension Clause.44
Key Meetings, Inc. v. United States (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2026)
Key Meetings, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:25-cv-06520-WHO, ECF No. 44 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2026) (Orrick, S.J.) (Ex. LAW-030). Count Three, for the third quarter of 2021, dismissed under § 70605(d), held constitutional as applied; the United States moved only against the section 3134 quarter, and the counts for the first two quarters of 2021 proceed (at 1-4, 9). A limitations decision.45
Gravenstein 116, LLC v. United States (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2026)
Gravenstein 116, LLC v. United States, No. 25-997 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 30, 2026), 180 Fed. Cl. 292 (Ex. LAW-075). Dismissed: section 280E's bar on deductions and credits for traffickers in controlled substances "squarely applies to the Employee Retention Credit, including the refundable portion of the credit" (at 2). The decision does not concern the Suspension Clause.46
The orders are public records the courts notice
Governmental orders are public records. A court "may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned," "must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information," and notice is available "at any stage of the proceeding."47 The Ninth Circuit notices government documents "publicly available on the Washington government website" where "neither party disputes the authenticity of the website nor the accuracy of the information," and it noticed California's COVID-19 State and county orders in South Bay and Brach; the Third Circuit wrote in Clark that "[a]lthough not every executive order discussed herein was entered into the record below, we may take judicial notice of their content"; the Court of Federal Claims treated California's executive and county orders as governmental orders on the pleadings.48 Every instrument in the Library is an order, regulation, statute or court order published by the issuing authority, retrieved with its source URL, hash and retrieval method recorded; the Library supplies "the necessary information." The standards page develops the point.
What the decisions establish
The Service's letters and Forms 886-A state the premise on which they decide claims:
To the extent that legislation did not modify the original provisions of the ERC, Notice 2021-20 governs the ERC for all periods.
No court has held that the Notice binds any employer. The United States told the District of Arizona that the Notice "lacks the force of law" and that "the statute will control whether a refund is warranted"; it told the Ninth Circuit that the Notice is "nonbinding guidance" without "the force of law in this respect (or any other)"; and in the Court of Federal Claims it did not argue that the Notice "sets out binding interpretations of the governing statute." The District of Arizona held that the Notice "carries no force of law and is entitled to no deference."49 A letter that applies the Notice as the governing law applies as law what the United States has told three courts is not law.
Six propositions follow from the decisions to date. First, the only court to construe "partially suspended" and "due to" on the parties' agreed definitions held the clause plain, refused "significant," "closure," a ten percent requirement and a proximate-cause test, and held that "due to" requires but-for causation. Second, the ten percent figure is, on the United States' account and two courts' holdings, a safe harbor "subject to rebuttal" and "a method for the test to be met not as a requirement to meet the test." Third, every court that read a proximate-cause requirement into the clause did so on a breadth rationale that is Congress's province, and the United States' own account is that the statute does not define the requirement. Fourth, the pleading-stage courts have refused order-by-order pleading, and the Library answers the one court that demanded specificity. Fifth, the orders themselves are judicially noticeable public records. Sixth, no decision has adjudicated any employer's claim on the Service's form Letter 105C sentence; each Notice gloss remains an interpretation the United States has invited every taxpayer to test in court, on the statute, by a preponderance of the evidence, on the orders themselves, in a forum where, by the United States' own description, "the Notice would be reviewed under the same standards that govern judicial review of any other agency rule."50