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Ex. DUT-OR-019 Standing duty Primary source read

Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Co., 298 Or 598, 695 P2d 897 (Feb. 12, 1985) (SC S30764): the standing Oregon rule on governmental safety requirements as the standard of care (negligence per se where the requirement is enacted by the legislature or promulgated under delegated authority for general public safety; a workplace safety rule protecting a class that includes the plaintiff is admissible and 'may' be taken into account by the trier of fact in deciding due care)

Shahtout, Petitioner on Review, v. Emco Garbage Company, Inc. et al, Respondents on Review

Supreme Court of Oregon · Oregon (Court)

The COVID Project

The record

Jurisdiction
Oregon
Level
Court
Authority
Oregon common law of negligence; ORS chapter 654 and the workplace safety rule OAR 437-56-095 (reverse signal alarm) then in force; Rich v. Tite-Knot Pine Mill, 245 Or 185 (1966); Davis v. Portland General Electric, 286 Or 195 (1979)
Issued
1985-02-12 Feb. 12, 1985
Effective
standing (Oregon common law, applied throughout 2020 and 2021) (read as 1985-02-12)
End
standing (read as 2021-09-30)
In force
Standing since Feb. 12, 1985 (a statutory duty; in force throughout the six quarters)
Quarters
2020 Q22020 Q32020 Q42021 Q12021 Q22021 Q3
Limitation types
Standing dutyOther
Addressees
  • persons generally (every defendant in a negligence action); employers and owners of premises whose conduct is measured against governmental safety requirements
Character
adjudication
Collection
Standing duties: Oregon DUT-OR

Operative words

Omission of a required safeguard such as an audible "reverse signal alarm" on a vehicle would fall below a mandatory standard of care and thus establish "negligence per se" toward any victim if the requirement were enacted by the legislature or if authority to promulgate it for general public safety were delegated to the Motor Vehicles Division.

Penalty

Civil liability in negligence (negligence per se where the requirement was enacted by the legislature or promulgated under delegated authority for general public safety; otherwise the requirement is evidence of the standard of due care).

What it required

States the rule that fixes the standard of care of every Oregon business that had no liability shield (DUT-OR-009): a safeguard 'required' by statute or by a rule promulgated under delegated authority 'for general public safety' sets 'a mandatory standard of care' whose omission is negligence per se toward any victim within the protected class, and a workplace safety rule adopted for employees (there, an Oregon OSHA-administered rule) is admissible where 'the risk is common to workers and other persons, and the government has determined that the risk calls for a mandatory safeguard,' so that 'the jury (or judge) may take this governmentally prescribed safeguard into account in deciding the issue of due care'; the public health laws (ORS 431A.005(8)), the gubernatorial orders with 'the full force and effect of law' (ORS 401.192(1)) and OAR 437-001-0744 were such requirements. Character as recorded: adjudication (negligence per se; common-law duty).

Retrieval note

The Caselaw Access Project's scan of 298 Or. 598-606 (Harvard Law School Library, static.case.law), with an OCR text layer in which the quoted sentence was verified; the case text was also read in the project's structured file (static.case.law/or/298/cases/0598-01.json). The court held that the particular rule (OAR 437-56-095) was adopted for employees, not the general public, so its violation was not negligence per se toward a non-employee, but that it was admissible and that the trier of fact 'may take this governmentally prescribed safeguard into account in deciding the issue of due care.' CourtListener (opinion 1169493) and Justia refuse automated fetching; the CAP file is the primary source used.